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Abstract 
 Corporate governance is a central and dynamic aspect of business. 
The term governance is derived from the latin word gubernare, meaning to 
steer. It usually applies to the steering of a ship. Thus, this implies that 
corporate governance involves the function of direction rather than control. 
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to 
the vital role it plays in the overall health of economic systems. Corporate 
governance was long ignored as a matter of potential importance for the 
development of a nation’s economy. The wave of U.S. corporate fraud in the 
1990s was attributed to deficiencies in corporate governance. The recent 
2008-2009 global financial crisis, triggered by the unprecedented failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, renewed interest on 
the role of corporate governance in the financial sector. The development of 
a strong corporate governance framework is important to protect 
stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries, and 
attract foreign direct investment. This paper looks at the collapse of Enron 
and the Parmalat, which was a particular Italian scandal. Parmalat, Enron, 
and other American firms such as Tyco and WorldCom all have a number of 
fudging at their core – efforts to make the companies look healthier than they 
were. Parmalat’s collapse began in November when its auditor raised 
questions about a $135 million derivatives profit. After additional evidence 
of accounting misstatements, the company’s chief executive and founder, 
Calisto Tanzi, resigned on the 15th of December. Four days later, the 
company disclosed the fake Bank of America letter. On the 23rd of 
December, Italian investigators stated that the company had used dozens of 
offshore companies to report non-existent assets to offset themselves. This 
was as much as $11 billion in liabilities. Also, this is in addition to the fact 
that Parmalat might have been falsifying its accounting figures for as long as 
15 years. 
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Introduction 
 Corporate governance is a central and dynamic aspect of business. 
The importance of corporate governance for corporate success as well as for 
social welfare cannot be overstated. Examples of massive corporate collapses 
resulting from weak systems of corporate governance have highlighted the 
need to improve and reform corporate governance at the international level. 
In the wake of Enron, Parmalat and other similar cases, countries around the 
world have reacted quickly by pre-empting similar events domestically. As a 
speedy response to these corporate failures, the USA issued the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act in July 2002. In January 2003, the Higgs Report and the Smith 
Report were published in the UK. This publication again was in response to 
the recent corporate governance failures. 
 Consequently, corporate governance has become one of the most 
commonly used phrases in the current global business vocabulary. The 
notorious collapse of Enron 2001, one of America’s largest companies, has 
focused international attention on company failures. In addition, it also 
presents the role that strong corporate governance play in preventing these 
failures.  
 “Corporate governance” comprises of a country’s private and public 
institutions, both formal and informal, which together govern the relationship 
between the people who manage corporations (corporate insiders) and all 
others who invest resources in various corporations in the country. 
 Therefore, corporate governance generally refers to the set of rule-
based processes of laws, policies, and accountability that governs the 
relationship between the investor (stockholder of a company) and the 
investee (management). Corporate governance attracts a great deal of 
attention in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the 
early 2000s U.S. corporate scandals, like Enron and WorldCom. However, 
after the threat of global contagion financial crises passed, corporate 
governance was relegated to the back of academic research. 
 Therefore, the focus of this paper is to analyze the challenges that 
transition countries faces when moving from a politically-based relationship 
to a relationship that is rule-based. Furthermore, it also analyses the role of 
corporate governance as a major factor in the unprecedented transformation 
of transition countries to a market economy. 
 
The Collapse of Enron  
 In 2001, Enron became a household name – and probably in most 
households in most countries around the world. 
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 On the 2nd of December 2001, Enron became one of the 10 largest 
companies in the USA. In the following months, more and more evidence 
emerged about the weaknesses and fraudulent activity of corporate 
governance. However, countries across the world have been unsettled and 
disturbed by the shock of this event and are now examining their own 
corporate governance systems in micro-detail. This they do by looking for 
similar weaknesses and potential like Enrons. Enronitis has spread across the 
globe like a lethal virus, infecting every company and every shareholding 
institutions. In addition, it also had a significant effect on worrying even by 
the smallest shareholder and unnerving the financial markets. 
 Enron was a Huston-based energy company founded by a brilliant 
entrepreneur, Kenneth Lay. The company was created in 1985 by a merger 
of two American gas pipeline companies. Within a period of 16 years, the 
company was transformed from a relatively small concern, involved in gas 
pipelines, and oil and gas exploration, to the world’s largest energy trading 
company (The Economist, 28 November 2002). Enron, the champion of 
energy deregulation that grew into one of the nation's 10 largest companies, 
collapsed yesterday. This collapse occurred after a rival backed out of a deal 
to buy Enron, and after many big trading partners stopped doing business 
with the company. 
 Enron, based in Houston, has been widely expected to seek 
bankruptcy protection. With $62 billion in assets as of September 30, it 
would be the biggest American company ever to go bankrupt. Hence, this 
company dwarfs the filing by Texaco in 1987. Late in the day, Enron's chief 
financial officer, Jeff McMahon, stated that the company was still talking to 
banks about a restructuring and a consideration of other options. 
 The role of a company’s board of directors is to oversee corporate 
management in order to protect the interests of shareholders. However, in 
1999, Enron’s board waived conflict of interest rules to allow chief financial 
officer, Andrew Fastow, to create private partnerships to do business with 
the firm. These partnerships appear to have concealed debts and liabilities 
that would have had a significant impact on Enron’s reported profits. 
Subsequently, Enron’s collapse raises the issue of how to reinforce the 
directors’ capability and will to challenge questionable dealings through 
corporate managers. 
 Several corporate governance problems have emerged due to Enron’s 
wreckage. Unfettered power in the hand of the chief executive is an obvious 
problem, and is one that characterized Enron’s management. Also, there 
were numerous illustrations of unethical activity within the Enron 
organization that continued to come to light long after its downfall. For 
example, in May 2002, it became clear from the documents released by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that Enron’s energy traders 
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developed and used strategies or tricks to manipulate the markets where 
Califonia bought electricity. 
 Overall, corporate governance in Enron was weak in almost all 
aspects. Thus, the board of directors is composed of a number of people who 
lacks moral character. Also, they are often willing to engage themselves in 
fraudulent activity. This was the genuine root of the company’s corporate 
governance failure. 
 There has been a proliferation of books on the downfall of Enron, 
seeking to explain why events transpired as they did. As we have seen, the 
USA and the UK strong reaction to Enron’s collapse and corporate 
governance has been hurled to the centre stage. This occurs as a result of the 
weaknesses at the heart of Enron’s corporate governance system. The long- 
term effects of Enron will hopeful be a cleaner and more ethical corporate 
environment across the globe. Furthermore, the continuous updating of 
corporate governance codes of practice and systematic review of corporate 
governance checks and balances are necessary to avoid other Enrons in the 
future. 
 Clearly, corporate governance check and balances can only serve to 
detect, not cure, unethical practices. A complicating factor in issues of fraud 
and ethical breakdown is the intangible nature of fraud. In addition, there is a 
grey area surrounding what is right or wrong, good or bad in human 
behaviour. Some comments made by Sheldon Zenner, an American white-
collar criminal and civil lawyer, when speaking of the Enron trial, helped to 
illuminate this issue.  
   
Corporate Governance Failure in Parmalat 
 Separation of ownership and control in a large stock corporation 
would be of no particular consequence if the interests of owners and 
managers coincided. Corporate governance is concerned with overcoming 
the problems of the monitoring and controlling of managerial performance. 
This occurs whenever corporate ownership and corporate control are 
separated as a result of dispersed share ownership. The primary function of 
corporate governance is to ensure that companies are runned based on the 
interests of corporate shareholders. However, these shareholders provide 
financial resources in running them. In the UK and US, owners of typical 
corporation are many, and their shares are small relative to the size of the 
corporation.   
 The collapse of Enron during 2001 has brought about a focused 
attention on the effectiveness of the non-executive director function. The 
corporate board, with its mix of expertise, independence, and legal power, is 
a potentially powerful governance mechanism. 
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 Parmalat Finanziara, the Italian dairy and food giant, is fast joining 
Enron and WorldCom as a household name for corporate scandal. The 
alleged financial fraud at Parmalat spans more than a decade. Also, it 
involves sums whose estimates have ballooned from EUR 4 billion to more 
than EUR 8 billion. Founder, chairman, and chief executive Calisto Tanzi 
has been ousted from the company and board and is under arrest. Enrico 
Bondi, who replaced Tanzi in December, has been given new authority to act 
as the sole administrator of Parmalat. Therefore, he has 180 days to save 
what he can of the company. 
 While Bondi races against time to unearth the sources of the scandal, 
some corporate governance experts are already drawing lessons. 
 The media have termed parmalat, a particular Italian scandal, and 
have suggested that the situation was more likely to arise in a country like 
Italy than elsewhere (Mulligan & Munchau, 2003; Melis, 2005). Given the 
criticisms of Italian corporate governance in the literature, this is not 
surprising (Melings, 2005; La Porta et al., 1997). 
 Parmalat was owned by a complex group of companies. In addition, 
it is controlled by one strong blockholder (the founding Tanzi family) 
through pyramidal structure (see Melis 2005). Indeed, Melis (1999) 
explained that such ownership structures with opaque patterns of ownership 
and control are not uncommon in Italian companies. Furthermore, Melis 
(2000) stated that the weaknesses of Anglo Saxon systems of corporate 
governance were traditionally strong managers: strong blockholders and 
unprotected minority shareholders. The case of Parmalat was typical of this 
form of corporate governance. This is with controlling Tanzi shareholders 
channeling corporate resources illegally to themselves, at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Melis, 2005). 
 Although Italian corporate governance is characterized by monitors, 
namely the statutory auditors and the external auditing firm, this was not able 
to protect the company from self-destruction. A direct analogy may be drawn 
between the cases of Enron and Parmalat, in terms of fraudulent activities 
and the companies’ audit firms. However, for Enron to exist, Parmalat has 
survived its ordeal and has turned on the auditors in order to recover funds. 
Another difference is in the way that the auditing firms involved with 
Parmalat managed to extricate themselves from the crisis. However, Arthur 
Andersen was destroyed in the aftermath of Enron. 
 Melis (2005) highlighted a series of other serious corporate 
governance failures which led to the parmalat’s crisis. Firstly, one of the 
non-executive directors in Parmalat was not independent as he had been 
working in Parmalat as a senior manager since 1963. Secondly, the chairman 
and chief executive position were not separated as was recommended by 
corporate governance codes of practice in Parmalat Finanziaria. Hence, both 
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positions were held by Tanzi. Thirdly, the Preda corporate governance code 
in Italy specified that where a group of shareholders controls a company, it is 
even more important for some directors to be independent from the 
controlling shareholders. This was certainly not upheld by Parmalat. Also, 
there was no adequate explanation given by the company for this lack of 
compliance.     
 As in the case of Enron, the failure of Parmalat to establish careful 
checking and monitoring structures within the company’s governance 
framework laid it bare to the abuse of power and fraudulent activity. Unless 
these devices for detecting fraud and misconduct are in place, it is relatively 
easy for Enron-like situation to arise. 
 Therefore, corporate governance in Italy was in sixth place as we can 
see in the graph below. 
 
(source: http://www.economist.com/node/2349958) 
 
 The Parmalat case may seem to differ in terms of the simplicity of its 
fraud. The audited statements from Bonlat were used to show cash balances 
that were reported by the parent company. Thus, it used in offsetting high 
levels of debt on its balance sheet. Each quarter with a set of forged 
documents would show purported cash holdings at Bonlat that matched the 
head office's requirements. Furthermore, Deloitte seems to have accepted 
Grant Thornton's audits unquestioningly. On the other hand, bankers and 
investors took the audited group figures as reassurance that, although 
complex, the group's finances were essentially sound. In addition, they failed 
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to ask why a company with so much cash needed to borrow so much. 
(http://www.economist.com/node/2349958) 
 
Conclusion 
 Corporate governance is the organizational arrangement by which a 
company represents and serves the interests of its investors. It encompasses 
anything from the company’s boards to executive compensation schemes to 
bankruptcy laws. 
 Like the American cases, the Parmalat scandal has raised questions 
about how the company could fudge its numbers for so long without any 
help from outside. The auditors, says Mittelstaedt, should have least spoken 
to Bank of America to verify that they held the $4.9 billion Parmalat 
claimed. 
 The system of checks and balances that support corporate governance 
needs to function effectively. Consequently, both Enron and Parmalat 
highlight the essential functions of non-executive directors, audit and 
disclosure, as well as ethicality of management. Corporate governance 
mechanisms cannot prevent unethical activity by top management. However, 
they can at least act as a means of detecting such activity by top management 
before it is too late. When an apple is rotten, it has no cure. Nevertheless, the 
rotten apple can be removed before the infection spreads and infects the 
whole barrel. Therefore, an analysis of the Enron and Parmalat cases shows 
that both the US and corporate governance systems are so different in 
character. Additionally, they can be vulnerable to abuse and corporate 
governance weaknesses which are similar in nature. This is really what 
effective corporate governance is all about. Therefore, this study aims to 
explore the various checks and balances, and mechanisms by which good 
corporate governance ensures successful business and social welfare 
maximization. 
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